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What a year. During 2012, while economic forecasts were being repeatedly 
revised downwards, and more and greater cuts to general public provision 
were enthusiastically promised by the coalition government, the UK gambled 
everything on a Keynesianism of  the spectacle: billions were lavished on the 
Olympics and Paralympics, and the countless sideshows that accompanied 
them nationwide as part of  the London 2012 Festival. The phrase ‘bread and 
circuses’ hardly does justice to misallocation of  public funds on such a scale. 
Whether the games cost £9bn, or £11bn, or some other figure that hasn’t 
yet been calculated, we are breathlessly assured that it was worth it because 
of  the returns that are going to accrue in the months and years to come 
(returns which are unfortunately, by their very nature, so often unquantifiable 
in mere numerical terms). What has been promised is a kind of  heritage 
of  the future, a Govian-Schamaesque heroic history that is still to be made: 
tomorrow belongs to us.
Meanwhile, however, the UK is a nation increasingly ill at ease with 
itself. Our government explains that continued recession is caused not by 
the disappearance of  demand in the economy but by instability in Europe; 
there is therefore no need to revise the coalition’s economic strategy, even 
if  they can’t agree amongst themselves exactly what it is. Simultaneously, 
public attitudes are turning against the poor, those on benefits, and even 
the disabled (could it be that the Paralympics had the unintended effect of  
making ‘disability’ appear to be simply a refusal to get off  your arse and stop 
whinging?) The fourth estate seems genuinely confused, waiting anxiously 
for Lord Leveson’s report while fulminating against foreign scoundrels for 
printing pictures of  a nearly-naked duchess that they would love to have 
Daniel Jewesbury
Belfast – Our Time, Our Place
93
scooped themselves. The constitutional position of  the UK is more uncertain 
than it has been for many decades: the national government is composed of  
parties that are in opposition or have no representation at all in the devolved 
assemblies, each of  which has different powers to all the others, and different 
parties standing in it; and a referendum on Scottish independence is now set 
to take place in 2014.
Yet none of  the regions can be more anomalous than Northern Ireland, 
the only one of  the four ‘nations’ of  the UK not to be a nation at all. Even 
in deciding what to call it one exposes one’s political bias (throughout this 
text I’ve used the names ‘Northern Ireland’ and ‘the North’ interchangeably, 
mainly because I have a reasonably complex and ambivalent set of  
understandings about its political and economic viability and legitimacy). 
Northern Ireland is effectively doubly disenfranchised from UK politics. The 
only one of  the parties theoretically capable of  forming a UK government 
to stand in Northern Irish elections is the Conservatives; in 2005, they stood 
in only three of  the North’s eighteen seats and lost their deposits in each 
one. In 2010 they merged with the Ulster Unionists to form the ‘Ulster 
Conservatives and Unionists – New Force’, which resulted in the UUP 
losing their only Westminster seat. With no access to a significant democratic 
mandate at Westminster, we also have an Assembly in which sectarianism 
is actually written into its procedures: the terms of  the power-sharing 
mechanism, used to ensure cross-community support for legislative motions 
passed at Stormont, mean that each member must declare themselves as 
Unionist or Nationalist on taking their seat. And the list of  powers reserved 
by Westminster, which of  course is different to those reserved in Scotland 
or Wales, means that the Assembly is mostly just a glorified parish council, 
unable to raise its own revenues or to set its own total expenditure. It is 
desperately lacking in political expertise, infested with sectarian clientelism, 
and boasts several members – including ministers – who refuse to accept the 
scientific basis of  evolution.
On a bright, blowy morning in April, I walked from my home in north 
Belfast to an arts centre on the Shankill Road. At the invitation of  a friend, I 
was attending the launch of  the ‘Greater Shankill Neighbourhood Renewal 
Area Action Plan’. Community activists had talked and bargained and 
consulted for two years to produce the document, which is a familiar mix 
of  bullet points, numbered paragraphs, statistics, and tables of  aspirational 
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‘action points’ – the technocratic language that government has taught civil 
society to use whenever it wishes to engage it in conversation.
We drank tea and ate croissants with jam as the plan was introduced in 
the enormous main hall, normally used for gigs or plays. Projected onto 
the screen were the usual laudable intentions – plans to address the chronic 
unemployment and the lack of  skills among the working-age population, 
plans to make the Shankill ‘an area where drugs are not easily available’, and 
this time, an emphasis on ‘wrap-around’ support, a piece of  jargon which 
apparently means putting families at the centre of  the strategy: the aim of  the 
community is to support the family, as it in turn supports the individual, from 
the cradle to young adulthood and beyond. The report is only the latest in 
a pile of  similar plans, assessments, feasibility studies and the like, produced 
by the huge number of  community groups and voluntary organisations 
struggling for recognition in ‘post-conflict’ Belfast; but even now, fourteen 
years after the signing of  the Good Friday Agreement, it’s still all about 
accessing the most basic of  necessities.
The University of  Ulster is planning a major new development at its 
Belfast campus, on the doorstep of  Lower Shankill, but the Action Plan 
mentions nothing about young people from the area aspiring to study there. 
It says nothing about ‘learning’ being an aspiration in its own right; although 
the plan is seen as an approach for the next twenty years, there seems to 
be no expectation that kids in the Shankill should or could go to university 
(whatever the merits of  university education may or may not now be). The 
idea is just too far off, the suggestion being that the people of  the Shankill 
know their place, haven’t started getting notions about themselves. The 
Action Plan is a piece of  organised pleading for there to be some way of  
keeping this extremely poor community alive, but the launch was notable for 
the absence of  any well-placed political representatives. The two councillors 
who attended (from the DUP and SDLP) made no contribution. Across the 
peaceline, in the Falls Road, the development of  an agenda such as this would 
be driven from the outset by Sinn Féin and the community groups it works 
with. On the Shankill, community activists have a harder time persuading 
their elected representatives to show some interest in their cause.
The most obvious and dispiriting thing about the whole event, though, is 
that the document exists in a kind of  economic vacuum, hermetically sealed 
within its own good intentions. There is no recognition that even the very 
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humble hopes itemised on page after page, in table after table, are all the time 
getting further and further away from being realised. Northern Ireland has 
yet to feel the full effect of  the public sector cuts. We’re less than halfway 
through a five-year spending round that will see our block grant from London 
cut by 10 per cent in real terms, with spending on capital projects slashed by 
nearly 40 per cent; this in a region that raises from its own taxes barely half  
what it spends. As capital spending disappears, so more of  the construction 
firms that prospered during the boom go bankrupt each week. Schools, 
libraries and health centres will close. As public transport subsidies decrease, 
fares will go up, and communities will become more isolated. Funding to 
the community and voluntary sector, a crucial layer of  Northern Ireland’s 
efflorescent bureaucracy, will become minimal (the next generation of  ‘action 
plans’ will aspire to less, and achieve less again). And some time after the next 
election, the deferred water charges, for which no political party wanted to 
take responsibility, despite their arguments about the need for alignment with 
the rest of  the UK, will finally be introduced.
Across town, one of  item of  capital spend was, however, completed on 
time, at a public cost of  around £60m. The Titanic Belfast exhibition centre, 
in the middle of  the dusty brownfield wasteland that used to be the shipyards 
(now dubbed – what else? – the Titanic Quarter), opened in time to be the 
star attraction in a festival organised by the Tourist Board and City Council 
to commemorate the sinking of  the ship a century ago. The building is 
astounding, gravity-defying; its four cantilevered ‘wings’, resembling towering 
ships’ bows, look a little like a giant arrowhead planted in the ground. Belfast 
wags who have commented that it looks more like an iceberg than the Titanic 
have inadvertently divined Texan architect Eric Kuhne’s original inspiration 
for the building, which is in fact meant to encapsulate that dynamic, violent 
moment when steel struck ice in the frozen north Atlantic. Inside are various 
‘experiences’ descriptive of  the making, sailing, sinking and selling of  the 
famous liner, which for £13.50 the visitor can explore. I had an opportunity to 
look inside during a promenade theatre production put on by Belfast company 
Kabosh in the opening week. It is predictably impressive, with exciting views 
both in and outside the building. Surely, as Titanic museums go, it is the 
biggest and most elaborate in the world. It is true that the building has already 
had more than 500,000 visitors, and far surpassed its first year projections. 
The Northern Ireland Audit Office, however, believes that it needs to receive 
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290,000 paying visitors every year thereafter if  it is to break even, and predicts 
that, after the initial flurry of  interest, it can expect annual audiences only 
very slightly above that, around 305,000. Notwithstanding initial interest in 
this centenary year, the building is running on slender margins.
Whether you view the sad story of  the Titanic as primarily a tragic loss of  
life, a catastrophic failure of  individual human judgement, or a clear case of  
corporate manslaughter, the anniversary festivities in Belfast were peculiarly 
inappropriate. The chilly first half  of  April saw light shows in the drizzle, an 
open-air concert sponsored by MTV outside Titanic Belfast, and a slew of  
other theatrical productions, film screenings, exhibitions, walking tours and 
themed banquets (this must surely be the first time in a hundred years that 
Consommé Olga has appeared on so many menus). The Titanic Festival, 
however, is only one aspect of  a comprehensive, ambitious marketing drive 
devised by the Northern Ireland Tourist Board, which has seen the whole of  
2012 branded with a logo of  red, blue and yellow ribbons bearing the slogan 
‘Our Time, Our Place’. (It seems strange that the Tourist Board should use 
the possessive plural in this introverted way; writer Colin Graham suggested 
in Belfast’s satirical Vacuum newspaper that the recent campaigns try to 
speak to two audiences at once, constructing an image of  ‘us’, for external 
consumption, as dynamic, optimistic, youthful, relaxed, jocular, welcoming 
and confident, while simultaneously reminding ‘us’ that we have to behave, 
and play nicely when the guests are here.)
As the summer progressed, we were able to enjoy Northern Ireland’s 
contribution to the Olympics spin-off  London 2012 Festival. The high point 
of  this was a ‘spectacular’ at the end of  June called ‘Land of  Giants’, in which 
the ‘icons’ and ‘legends’ of  Belfast’s past and present – Fionn mac Cumhaill, 
Lemuel Gulliver (Swift drew inspiration for his story from the topography 
around Belfast), the Harland & Wolff  cranes Samson and Goliath, the 
Titanic (again) and, of  course, us, who are ‘giant in ideas, talent and heritage’ 
– converged in a spasm of  ‘acrobatics, aerial dance, physical performance, 
music, special effects and pyrotechnics’, and drizzle.
There was hardly time to recover from all this pageantry (meagre cost: 
£1.2m) before the parading that accompanies any Northern Irish summer 
was underway. This year’s marching season was particularly active. On the 
Twelfth of  July, as they waited for the main march to depart, a loyalist band 
from the Shankill Road decided to create a new ‘flashpoint’ where none had 
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previously existed, by playing sectarian songs outside a Catholic church in 
the north city centre. This had the desired effect of  provoking statements of  
outrage from Catholic residents nearby, and a theme was set for the summer. 
Two major marches in August (the first time the Royal Black Perceptory’s 
‘Last Saturday’ march had been held in Belfast) and September (marking the 
centenary of  the signing, by half  a million men and women, of  the Ulster 
Covenant against the Third Home Rule Bill) duly returned to this spot, and 
photographers, camermen, and the professionally offended were ready for 
them. It seems likely that the loyalists’ strategy, inasmuch as they inadvertently 
stumbled upon one – wilfully igniting and then painstakingly neutralising a 
new locus of  conflict – was to find a new front for their ongoing campaign 
against the Parades Commission, the body which decides what marches and 
processions can take place, and under what conditions. The side effect of  
this political game was that attention was mostly diverted away from what 
they had hoped would be a story of  celebration and commemmoration at the 
Covenant event – a further attempted recuperation of  loyalism as ‘heritage’ 
– and focused instead on the possibility of  another violent confrontation in 
the city centre.
All in all, then, the Covenant centenary may have been something of  a 
missed opportunity; this history anyway proves harder to neutralise than the 
decline and dereliction of  the shipyards has been. This mixed story may give 
us some indication of  how the approaching decade of  equally uncomfortable 
centenaries – of  the Easter Rising, the slaughter of  the Ulster Division in the 
Battle of  the Somme, the Sinn Féin landslide in the 1918 general election, 
the War of  Independence, the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the foundation of  
Northern Ireland itself  in 1921 –  might be worked for public (and especially 
tourist) consumption. The Executive has set itself  a goal of  earning £1bn a 
year from all tourism by 2020. If  it hopes to achieve this, then it needs some 
strategy by which not only to neutralise but to capitalise on those recurrent 
opportunities for the North’s historical and political background to erupt 
once again into the foreground.
For the moment, though, we can draw a little breath as we wait for the next 
carnival to roll up, with 2013 marking Derry’s year as UK City of  Culture, and 
the whole bloody business, as Samuel Beckett put it, starting all over again.
So is this it? Is all this din of  celebration and self-congratulation our 
evidence that the post-conflict promises have finally been realised? In the 
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decade after the Agreement, Belfast reverberated to the noise of  construction. 
It felt like a small eastern European nation emerging from state socialism: 
areas of  the city were zoned and rezoned, deals were struck in private, and 
vast speculative building projects commenced. Meanwhile, experiments were 
conducted with privatising the public realm: the new shopping centre at 
Victoria Square, luxury brands in tow, became an unofficial city centre, and 
the various public agencies drew plans explaining how ‘retail-led regeneration’ 
would provide the means to escape our painful recent history. The streetscape 
was remodelled with gratuitous public art able to speak to us of  our history 
and our future, while helpfully pointing the way to the next department store. 
New buildings rose – among them the tallest residential building in Ireland, 
the Obel tower; and, just occasionally, old ones accidentally burned down, as 
they tend to do in a rapidly redeveloping city. Homeowners saw house prices 
record the fastest rises in the whole of  the UK (admittedly from a much 
lower base), with some properties trebling in value in just five years.
Then, in 2008, it ground to a halt. As investors and speculators in the 
Republic of  Ireland saw their loans recalled and their banks bailed out, work 
stopped on a number of  high-profile city centre projects, with others not 
even commencing. Only in 2011 did the extent of  northern developers’ 
exposure to the Republic’s crisis finally become clear, as the National Assets 
Management Agency, the Republic’s ‘bad bank’, published a list of  sites in 
the North that had passed into the reluctant ownership of  the taxpayers of  
the Irish Republic. This was not the way we had expected reunification might 
take place.
All this is familiar enough, hardly distinctive. What was different about 
Belfast, and about Northern Ireland as a whole (although the extent of  
redevelopment has remained extremely uneven across the region) was the 
particular ‘moral economy’ that was quite quickly created during the boom, 
and which persisted through successive interruptions and prorogations of  the 
Assembly, indeed was the single constant throughout. It entails, in essence, a 
refinement of  the argument which maintains that there can be ‘no alternative’ 
to speculator-driven redevelopment. In ‘normal’ societies, this argument is 
a repetition of  the general abandonment of  the notion of  public good: the 
final, unarguable victory of  trickle-down economics in the urban sphere. In 
Belfast this took on an added dimension; since there could be no alternative 
to this model for regeneration, and since our choice could only be between 
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the hope and promise of  peace on the one hand, and the tangible threat of  
continued war on the other, private developers found themselves imbued with 
a new moral mission. They would be the ones who really delivered the peace, 
in brick, concrete, glass and steel; the politicians’ contribution was merely 
to learn to behave for long enough to allow it to happen (particularly since 
planning powers have yet to be devolved to elected local representatives). 
Very quickly it became apparent that to oppose this prescription for urban 
redevelopment meant to oppose peace itself. The idea was given form when a 
property developer, responsible for a range of  controversial projects around 
the city, was appointed as the Chair of  the new Policing Board.
While carte blanche – or rather, active encouragement – was thus being 
given to private speculators, local bureaucrats and politicians were becoming 
especially interested in the opportunity to compete with European and 
international cities for a range of  potentially valuable cultural prizes. This 
market had been hot since at least the early 1990s, as contemporary city-states 
detached themselves from their regions, rebranded themselves into corporate 
entities and bid to be European Capital of  Culture, or to host a biennale or, 
perhaps, an international sporting championship. Belfast’s first stab at this 
racket was marked by some ignominy, when the bid to be Capital of  Culture 
in 2008 was unsuccessful; but the lesson was learned that the circuits of  
capital are international, and that our competitors are not in Dublin, Derry or 
Glasgow, but Barcelona, Melbourne and Dubai.
The political conflict, meanwhile, became sublimated into a cultural 
contest, about symbols and languages, and even this has started to lose its 
venom (the summer’s events notwithstanding). Both the DUP and Sinn Féin 
have become adept at facing in two different directions at once: towards their 
electoral base, and (jointly) towards the market and its demands. The base 
is still defined in sectarian terms, and the address to them remains clearly 
about protecting ‘our’ interests. It might be expected that the requirement on 
the two main parties to choreograph their joint approach to business would 
bring with it a necessity to imagine some kind of  shared future, but this 
is impossible while ’power-sharing’ is constructed in such nakedly sectarian 
terms. The two parties are locked in an interdependent embrace, with no 
interest in articulating a shared, public belonging that can go beyond crudely 
ethnopolitical ‘provision’; so long as they are able to maintain the sectarian 
balancing act, the job of  ‘management’ can go on indefinitely.
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The reflex reaction to such complaints is to mutter that the past can so 
easily come back if  we aren’t careful. Yet these days, there is very little stomach 
for the conflict as it was; increasingly, however, there is an anomic, impotent 
rage at the continued failure of  the devolved administration to provide for 
the poorest here, who continue to fail educationally, get the worst jobs or no 
jobs at all, and die younger. The opposite of  the management of  Northern 
Ireland for global business interests is not renewed sectarian violence, it’s a 
class anger that crosses ethnoreligious lines – a nightmare that the politicians 
prefer not to countenance.
It’s a commonplace to hear that Northern Ireland’s bloated public sector 
is unsustainable and must now be cut. One third of  employment is in the 
public sector, and another third is directly or indirectly dependent on it. 
Public expenditure stands at 70 per cent of  GDP. But, beyond the familiar 
argument that the private sector is underdeveloped in the North (so much 
for the illusory peace dividend), what creates this imbalance is, once again, 
the sectarianised administration of  devolution: from the neighbourhood, 
and up to the topmost level of  the state, we are awash with semi-state and 
state-funded organisations, all busily publishing regeneration plans and 
conducting consultations. At the level of  the various government agencies, 
the confusion of  responsibilities between local authorities, the Departments 
of  Social Development, Regional Development, and Environment, the 
different regeneration quangos, and of  course the Northern Ireland Office 
means that it is impossible for ordinary citizens, acting in their own right, to 
put any effective pressure on policymakers. In turn that interaction between 
ordinary people, public bodies and politicians has become professionalised, 
with community groups and partnership boards proliferating in the breach, 
and any democratic accountability obscured.
Can we really not imagine this place any differently? I went to see a friend, 
Leontia Flynn, a poet (she’s constantly referred to in Northern Ireland as a 
‘local poet’, much to her bemusement – does a local poet have some sort 
of  public function? To what, exactly, are they really local?) She’s had her 
crack at criticising the tawdriness and banality of  our post-conflict society. 
She found it ironic that the arts, which had flourished, in certain ways, during 
the most difficult times, were now merely a minor element in the rebranding 
of  Belfast, and of  Northern Ireland; creativity, or culture in the vaguest, 
most general sense, are obviously valuable buzzwords in any adman’s spiel 
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about the place, but not usually in any engaged or sustained way. Poetry, she 
admits, continues to be something that is saleable about the North, and she 
understands that she too is expected, when she travels to readings abroad 
(she was just back from Poland), to ‘represent’, somehow, this new Northern 
Ireland (something else that causes her some bemusement). But even while 
the tourist brands sell images of  who ‘we’ are, and the next generation of  
Northerners, like young people everywhere else, happily accept their duty to 
commodify and consume virtual ‘selves’, through social networks, designer 
labels and musical scenes, it doesn’t appear that a ‘culture’ which was often so 
introspective during the Troubles has much that is genuinely communicable 
to offer to anyone outside, at least not something that is actually ‘about’ us; 
or here. We’ve stopped talking about ourselves, to some degree, because we’re 
not sure where exactly we are yet. Graham Walker, a professor of  politics at 
Queen’s University, told me that his students want to write about the political 
conflict in the 1970s or ’80s, but have very little to say about the committee 
structure of  the Northern Ireland Assembly.
The Greater Shankill Neighbourhood Renewal Area Action Plan contains 
a section titled ‘It Needs A Designation’. The partnership who authored 
the plan understand that they need their area ‘designated’ – branded – if  
they are to stand some chance of  success. “This plan needs a structure and 
the Greater Shankill needs a designation to realise it... In Belfast we have 
done this around physical development. It was called ‘Laganside’ and has its 
latest manifestation in Titanic Quarter or around cultural development as in 
Cathedral Quarter.” The Shankill is desperate for a brand.
Another friend, a former actor from the North who’s now a 
psychotherapist, talked to me about Northern Ireland in the context of  the 
family therapy she practices. We spoke about the lack of  an ‘identity’ that can 
create a single, functional, inclusive society in Northern Ireland. The Good 
Friday Agreement and the peace process swept away a society, such as it was, 
but made no effort to replace it with something else, indeed the whole point 
was not to replace with anything else; the history of  the last fourteen years has 
been about the impossibility of  arriving at this ‘something else’ whilst ideas 
of  sovereignty and nationality remain so irreconcilable, so incommensurate.
I talked with Graham Walker about the threat to this fragile sense of  
collective self  from the Scottish referendum on independence. Unionists have 
reacted with some hysteria to the plans: Sir Reg Empey, former leader of  the 
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UUP, announced that Scottish independence could ‘reignite the difficulties 
we have just managed to overcome’, while John Taylor, now Lord Kilclooney, 
wrote to The Scotsman that if  parts of  Scotland voted to remain in the Union, 
it would be better to offer partition than to subjugate them to the will of  the 
majority. In a speech at the annual conference of  the British-Irish Association 
in September this year, First Minister Peter Robinson made a detailed case 
for the continuation of  the Union, and even seemed to suggest (in somewhat 
more historically measured tones than those of  Kilclooney) that the partition 
of  Ireland has not been an entirely untrammelled success: ‘While Ulster was 
always a place apart on the island of  Ireland, partition changed things – and 
not just for Northern Protestants, but for Southern Catholics and Southern 
Protestants for that matter, as well’. Reporting of  the speech in the media was 
limited to Robinson’s claim that the call for independence could be defeated 
‘with a Saltire in one hand and a Union Flag in the other’,  a strange take 
on the IRA’s stated strategy in the 1980s of  achieving independence ‘with a 
ballot box in one hand and an Armalite in the other’.
Nonetheless I wondered whether there mightn’t be a pocket of  opinion 
within Unionism that might, if  push came to shove, prefer to align itself  
with an independent Scotland rather than a distant, ‘disinterested’ England. 
Walker feels that members of  the DUP might harbour a sentimental affection 
of  this kind, but that even they would recognise that it couldn’t be done in 
reality. If  the Scots do vote against independence,  it will probably mark the 
end of  the Barnett Formula, by which the block grant has been distributed 
across the UK since the 1970s. Moreover it could mark the beginning of  
discussions about a more equally devolved, or even fully federalised UK 
(something else which Robinson’s BIA speech accepted needed to be more 
thoroughly examined). Both these measures could, in the long run, make an 
enormous difference to the political and economic culture of  the North: 
Barnett, particularly, should be replaced with a formula based on needs, 
rather than on a simple headcount, especially given the massive changes to 
the consitutional arrangement since it was implemented. Walker believes that 
the devolved nations have not made enough of  their opportunity to work 
in partnership from the fringes of  the Union, and nor have they used the 
range of  institutions available to them – particularly the British-Irish Council 
(no relation of  the BIA), a body set up under the terms of  the Good Friday 
Agreement as an ‘East-West’ counterbalance to allay Unionist fears about 
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proposed North-South bodies. Despite existing since 1998, the Council 
only established a full-time secretariat earlier this year; it has a remit to meet 
and issue communiqués on a range of  topics – including languages, spatial 
planning, housing and the environment. A mechanism through which the 
nations can speak to one another bilaterally, without the involvement of  
London, the Council could offer a degree of  collective bargaining power to 
the Irish, Northern Irish, Scots and Welsh. But the ad hoc, piecemeal way 
in which devolution was delivered by New Labour means anyway that the 
status quo is unlikely to be tenable for very long. ‘The more anomalies persist 
between the manner in which devolution has been realised in the different 
parts of  the UK, the more it grates and the looser the fabric becomes,’ Walker 
warns.
As it stands, Belfast at the end of  2012 continues to be a blank slate, 
upon which can be written the most lurid fantasies of  urban planners, undead 
private developers and tourism wonks. A proposal recently published by 
one government agency for a scrappy patch of  land beside the River Lagan 
included sketches of  a zip-cord stretched between the banks of  the river. The 
worrying lesson of  Titanic Belfast is that anything is now possible, if  the right 
people decide that it’s necessary. They are, of  course, doing it for our benefit. 
